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UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.990788-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996). On December 1,1999, 
this matter was transferred to this Court by the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). R. 231-33. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The duty of a property owner to exercise reasonable care in keeping its 
premises safe for business invitees is a duty to inspect for dangerous conditions. 
This issue was raised by the defendant's motion for summary judgment. R. 48-49. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment. Reviewing the trial court's grant of a motion 
for summary judgment "includes a determination of whether the trial court correctly 
applied governing law, affording no deference to the trial court's determination or 
conclusions of law." Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic. Inc.. 2000 UT 18, 
Tf4, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; Gardner v. Perrv Citv. 2000 UT App 1, ^[6,994 P.2d 811. "In 
matters of pure statutory interpretation, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for 
correctness and gives no deference to its legal conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville 
Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
2. The trial court correctly determined that the defendant was immune due to its 
alleged failure to make an adequate inspection. 
This issue was raised by the defendant's motion for summary judgment. R. 48-49. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is considered under the same standard of 
review as is the first issue. 
3. The defendant is entitled to immunity because the alleged injuries of the 
plaintiff arose from a latent defect for which immunity has not been waived. 
This issue was raised by the defendant's motion for summary judgment. R. 48-49. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is considered under the same standard of 
review as is the first issue. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee - Exceptions. (1996) (partial) 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from:... 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent 
inspection;... 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, 
structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement;... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Linda Ilott filed her complaint against the University of Utah on September 4, 
1996. R. 1-13. In it, she alleged that she was injured by the dangerous condition of a. 
bleecher seat at Rice Stadium on October 29,1994, and that the University had either 
actual or constructive notice of this dangerous condition and was negligent in not 
repairing or warning of the danger. R. 2. Defendant filed its motion for summary 
judgment on March 24,1998. R. 35-81. After oral argument on May 18,1999 (R. 192), 
the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on July 19,1999 granting the 
defendant's motion. R. 210-20. The trial court's Order of Dismissal was filed on August 
23,1999. R. 221-22. Plaintiff s notice of appeal was filed on September 2,1999. R. 
223-24. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On October 29,1994, near the end of a University of Utah football game at Rice 
Stadium, Linda Ilott, a business invitee, was injured while she was walking on a wooden 
bleacher seat that gave way under her weight. R. 2-3, 59,69-70. Plaintiff testified that 
the bleacher appeared to be safe and that there was no outward evidence to indicate that 
the wooden bleacher would not support her weight. R. 69-70. 
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Each summer before football season begins, the University did a visual and weight 
inspection of all of the bleachers and seats in Rice Stadium. University employees were 
to walk up and down each row and each aisle in Rice Stadium doing a visual and weight 
inspection of every seat and bleacher in Rice Stadium. As part of that inspection, 
University employees stood on every bleacher seat and every seat in the Stadium. The 
visual and weight inspection was done to locate seats or bleachers which might be a 
hazard and/or that needed to be repaired or replaced. Any seats or bleachers which the 
inspection determined might constitute a hazard for those attending activities at Rice 
Stadium were either replaced or repaired before the next public event in the stadium. A 
pre-season inspection was done by the University, including an inspection of the bleacher 
seat which Ilott complains about, prior to the 1994 football season. This inspection did 
not show that the bleacher seat in question was hazardous, unreasonably dangerous or that 
it needed to be replaced. R. 83-84. 
Before each game during the football season, University employees made a visual 
inspection of each bleacher and seat in Rice Stadium. Again, any bleacher or seat that 
was determined might be dangerous was replaced or repaired before the next public 
event. Such a pre-game inspection was done before the October 29,1994, football game 
at which the plaintiff was injured. R. 84. If the University's inspections had shown any 
danger from the wooden bleacher seat in question, it would have been repaired or 
replaced before the game. Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs claim is that the University of Utah failed to exercise reasonable care in 
keeping the wooden bleacher that gave way under the plaintiffs weight in a safe 
condition. But plaintiff then claims that this cause of action does not involve an 
inspection in any manner. Under Utah law, the duty of an owner to a business invitee, 
such as the plaintiff, is to make reasonable inspections to discover any dangerous 
conditions. Plaintiff does not claim that the University of Utah had actual notice of the 
dangerous condition of this particular wooden bleacher, but rather that it should have 
known. Such a claim is barred by the defendant's retention of immunity for a claim that 
it failed to make an inspection or that it made an inadequate or negligent inspection. 
Plaintiffs own testimony was that the wooden bleacher seat in question did not 
appear dangerous and that it seemed safe and capable of supporting her weight. 
Defendant performed ongoing inspections of the seating in Rice Stadium to discover any 
dangerous conditions and remedy them. The evidence before the trial court was 
undisputed that the defective condition of the wooden bleacher seat in question was a 
latent defect for which the University of Utah has retained its immunity. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UNIVERSITY'S DUTY THAT ILOTT CLAIMS 
WAS VIOLATED WAS A DUTY TO INSPECT 
Plaintiffs claim that no duty to inspect on the part of the University is contained in 
her cause of action is based on a misperception of Utah law. Ilott correctly states that the 
5 
standard of care for an owner of land to a business invitee for a dangerous condition 
permitted to exist on the land is that the defendant "knew or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should have known of said condition, and failed to exercise reasonable care to 
remedy said condition . . . . " Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co.. 120 Utah 31,232 P.2d 210, 
212 (1951). See also Peats v. Commercial Security Bank. 746 P.2d 1191,1192-93 (Utah 
App. 1987). This language was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court from Restatement of 
Torts § 343. The duty of the owner to exercise reasonable care to learn of dangerous 
conditions is a duty to inspect the premises. A business invitee is: 
entitled to expect such care not only in the original construction of the 
premises, and any activities of the possessor or his employees which may 
affect their condition, but also in inspection to discover their actual 
condition and any latent defects, followed by such repair, safeguards, or 
warning as may be reasonably necessary for his protection under the 
circumstances. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. b (1964). 
"The occupier must not only use care not to injure the visitor by negligent 
activities, and warn him of latent dangers of which the occupier knows, but he must also 
inspect the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions of which he does not 
know,..." William L. Prosser, Law of Torts § 61 at 392-93 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes 
omitted). In Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Co.. 3 Utah 2d 203,208,282 P.2d 304,307 
(1955) the court expressly held that: "[t]he duty owed by an owner of land to a business 
visitor is to inspect and maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn 
the visitor of any dangerous conditions existing thereon." This duty is greater than that 
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due a licensee. The difference between a business invitee and a licensee under Utah law 
is that the owner of land does not owe this duty to inspect his land to discover possible 
dangers to a licensee, only to a business invitee. Stevens v. Salt Lake County. 25 Utah 2nd 
168,172,478 P.2d 496,498-99 (1970). See also Darrington v. Wade. 812 P.2d 452,458 
(Utah App. 1991) ("Based on this standard, Wades, as owners of property intended to be 
leased for public admission, had a duty to inspect the property and either take reasonable 
measures to correct conditions creating a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm, or to ensure 
that their tenant corrected such conditions before admitting the public onto the property.") 
The duty of the University of Utah to inspect Rice Stadium is an integral part of 
the plaintiffs tort claim. Ilott has not alleged that Rice Stadium was defective in its 
design or construction. Rather she claims that the negligence of the defendant was in 
permitting the wooden bleacher in question to become defective and not repairing, 
replacing or warning of the danger. The duty to discover a danger that has arisen on the 
property is a duty to inspect. If an inspection would not have discovered the latent defect, 
then no cause of action has been stated. Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments. Ltd.. 754 
P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988) ("Further, plaintiff did not present evidence establishing 
whether defendant did or did not routinely inspect his buildings, or whether such 
inspection would have put defendant on notice that a dangerous condition existed. Even 
if we assume that defendant had a duty to inspect, that duty would not require discovery 
of a latent defect.") 
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The trial court correctly determined that "the crux of the plaintiffs case is in fact 
premised on the defendant's negligent or inadequate inspection." R. 214. That decision 
should be affirmed on appeal. 
Plaintiff also claims that there was an independent duty to warn of the alleged 
dangerous condition. Again, plaintiff misconstrues Utah's law. The above cited cases 
make it clear that the duty of the landowner is to either correct a dangerous condition or 
to give adequate notice of the same. A landowner has no duty to do either until it 
becomes aware that such a dangerous condition exists. 
II. THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH IS IMMUNE FROM 
THIS CLAIM FOR INJURIES ARISING OUT OF AN 
INADEQUATE OR NEGLIGENT INSPECTION 
Utah law placed upon the University of Utah a duty to inspect Rice Stadium for 
the benefit of the safety and health of the members of the public who attended public 
activities there as business invitees of the University. This duty was met by the 
University through a massive pre-season inspection and lesser pre-game inspections to 
discover and correct any dangerous conditions in the stadium. Plaintiffs claim is that the 
University's inspections failed to discover and correct the dangerous state of the wooden 
bleacher that gave way under her weight while she was walking on it. 
It is undisputed that the University of Utah is a governmental entity that was 
performing a governmental function. Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist. 849 P.2d 
1162,1164 (Utah 1993). Nor is it disputed that the applicable waiver of immunity under 
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which the plaintiff sues is conditioned upon the retentions of immunity found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1996). Plaintiff has not challenged these steps of the immunity 
analysis either on appeal or in the trial court. Plaintiffs only claim is that the inspections 
at issue in this action do not qualify as inspections under the express retention of 
immunity for making an inadequate or negligent inspection. 
This action does not involve negligent conduct by the inspector during the course 
of the inspection, such as was involved in Ericksen v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 858 P.2d 995 
(Utah 1993). Instead, the plaintiff seeks recovery from the defendant because the 
inspections at issue failed to uncover the dangerous condition of the wooden bleacher. 
This is the type of claim that this retention of immunity was intended to protect from 
liability. It was intended "to immunize only the conclusions and results of an inspection 
where the inspector may have overlooked something or made a faulty judgment in 
deciding whether to approve or reject the subject of the inspection." Ericksen, 858 P.2d 
at 998. 
Nor does this action involve a question of routine maintenance like that raised in 
Nixon v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995). This is indeed a case "where 
an inspector failed to determine that a particular building or piece of equipment was 
unsafe for the public as a whole." Nixon, 898 P.2d at 271. The Utah Supreme Court has 
not held, as plaintiff suggests, that only "professional" building inspectors are covered 
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under the retention of immunity for inspections. Nor is this immunity limited to 
government inspections of private property. 
In Velasquez v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.. 24 Utah 2d 217,469 P.2d 5 (1970), the 
court applied this retention of immunity to an alleged failure to adequately inspect the 
safety devices at a railroad crossing. The State of Utah was found to be immune because 
this involved an inspection and because the challenged actions had involved a 
discretionary function. The trial court correctly held that plaintiffs claims were barred by 
the retention of immunity for inspections. 
First, the plaintiffs injuries stem from the incorrect conclusion reached by 
the individuals who inspected the bleachers that all of the bleachers were 
safe for the public using Rice Stadium. In other words, the plaintiffs 
injuries resulted directly from an alleged oversight related to the actual 
inspection process. The second component of public duty is also met 
because the University's inspectors allegedly failed to determine that at 
least one of the bleachers, which collapsed when the plaintiff stood on it, 
was unsafe for public use. It is evident that the inspection of the bleachers 
was undertaken to insure public health and safety. Since the plaintiffs 
injuries arose as a result of incorrect conclusions and results of an 
inspection which was undertaken for the public in general, the exception to 
the waiver of immunity found in § 63-30-10(4) applies to bar the plaintiffs 
action. 
R. 218. For this reason, the trial court's dismissal of this action should be affirmed. 
III. THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH IS IMMUNE FROM 
INJURIES ARISING FROM A LATENT DEFECT 
The University of Utah's immunity has also been retained for any injury arising 
out of a "latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public... structure." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(17) (1996). A latent defect is "[a] defect which reasonably careful 
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inspection will not reveal." Vincent v. Salt Lake County. 583 P.2d 105,107 (Utah 1978); 
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd, 754 P.2d 89, 91 n.l (Utah App. 1988). 
While the plaintiff challenges the quality of the defendant's inspections, she 
presented no evidence to contradict the undisputed fact that the defect in the bleacher in 
question was latent and not patent. Ilott's own testimony is that she saw nothing wrong 
with the wooden bleacher in question and had no reason to believe that it was defective. 
Q. When you walked on those benches going up and down to visit with 
your nephew and return, did you notice that any of the planks on the 
benches appeared to be worn or weak or -
A. I didn't - with stepping, I didn't feel anything give way. They were just 
- they all looked the same. I - you know, they're kind of weathered, and 
they've been out in the weather. I wasn't really expecting anything to 
happen. I was quite surprised when my foot went down through. It really 
took me by surprise. I didn't really notice anything going up. And I didn't 
feel anything going down. And I didn't notice any cracks or anything. 
R.59. 
Q. As you walked along the bleachers to meet your nephew and then back 
to the - where you were sitting, did the bleachers appear to be safe to stand 
on? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you observe anything in the condition of the bleachers that made 
you suspect that they wouldn't support your weight? 
A. No. 
R.69. 
Q. Okay. Anything else? I'm just asking you about your own inspection. 
Could you see that from your inspection of the bleachers as you elected to 
walk up those bleachers that they were weathered and worn and likely to 
collapse? 
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A. They looked-they didn't look dangerous. They didn't look like they 
would collapse. I certainly was surprised when they did. They just-how 
would you describe it? They're bleachers that are out there. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I didn't observe anything that looked like it wouldn't support my 
weight. I didn't observe anything that looked like it would be unsafe. 
Q. Okay. That was both on your way up and on your way back down? 
A. Yeah. 
R.70 
Just as the plaintiff could see no patent defect in the wooden bleacher before the 
accident, the defendant's inspections also found no such defect. No evidence was 
presented that showed that a reasonably careful inspection would have led to the 
discovery of the latently dangerous or defective condition of the wooden bleacher in 
question. The duty to inspect does not include the duty to discover a latent defect. 
Gregory, 754 P.2d at 91. Without such evidence the University of Utah's motion for 
summary judgment was well taken under § 63-30-10 (17) and the dismissal of this action 
should be affirmed on these ground as well. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, defendant University of Utah asks this Court to 
affirm the dismissal of this action. 
DEFENDANT DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL ARGUMENT 
OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
The defendant-appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in 
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal are not such that oral argument or a 
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published opinion are necessary, though the defendant desires to participate in oral 
argument if such is held by the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this of April, 2000. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 




BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
623 East 2100 South 84106 
Attorneys for PlaintifFAppellant 
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ADDENDUM "A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA ILOTT, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 960906196 
vs. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
This case came before me for hearing on defendant University 
of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 18,:;1959^ f: ; I then;took 
the matter under advisement. Since then, I have examined the legal 
authorities cited by counsel in support of their respective 
positions and considered counsels' oral argument. For tne reasons 
stated below, I grant defendant's motion based on my conclusion 
that the conduct of the defendant claimed to be actionable arose 
from an inspection for which the University, as a governmental 
entity, is immune from suit. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
00210 
ILOTT V. U OF U PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The plaintiff alleges that on October 29, 1994, she attended 
a football game at Rice Stadium, a facility owned by the defendant. 
The plaintiff was returning to her seat when one of the planks used 
as bleacher seats in the north end-zone collapsed as she stepped on 
it, injuring her. 
In support of their Motion, the University presents the 
Affidavit of Gary Ratliff, who notes that w [e]ach summer before 
football season begins, the University does a visual and weight 
inspection of all of the bleachers and seats in the Rice Stadium." 
(Affidavit of Gary Ratliff at para. 1) . The plaintiff contests 
Mr. Ratliff's assertion that each of the three planks of every 
bleacher was visually or weight inspected by citing to the 
deposition testimony of Steven Pyne that he did not have specific 
recollection of conducting any inspections and repairs immediately 
prior to the October 29, 1994, football game. (Deposition of Steven 
Pyne at pp. 32-33). Mr. Pyne's deposition testimony creates an 
issue of fact concerning the scope of the defendant's inspection, 
but it is an issue which is rendered immaterial by Utah Code 
Annotated §63-30-10(4). 
0091' 
ILOTT V. U OF U PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The defendant contends that the governmental immunity 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated §63-30-10(4) and (17) bar the 
plaintiff's lawsuit. Section 63-30-10(4) provides as follows: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by 
making an inadequate or negligent inspection. 
The defendant asserts if its inspection should have disclosed a 
defective bleacher, then it is immune under subsection 4 because 
the plaintiff's injuries arose out of its "failure to make an 
inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection." 
In response to the defendant's immunity argument, the 
plaintiff suggests, unfortunately without discussion or analysis, 
that paragraph (4) does not apply because her claims do not involve 
a failure to inspect or negligent inspection. After reviewing the 
plaintiff's Complaint and the record developed pursuant to the 
ILOTT V. U OF U PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
University's Motion, I am persuaded when the plaintiff's claim that 
the University breached its duty to keep Rice Stadium safe and 
well-maintained is coupled with the undisputed fact that the 
University conducted regular inspections of the bleacher planks, 
inspection immunity bars plaintiff's suit as a matter of law. 
The plaintiff herself supplies the primary impetus for my 
determination that her claims are subject to inspection immunity in 
her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Memorandum"). The legal authority cited by plaintiff as 
"most instructive with respect to the issues before this Court" is 
quoted with emphasis for the proposition that xx [The defendant] was 
in the actual possession of the building ana naci a duty to searcn 
out defects in the premises in order that they be reasonably safe 
for the presence of business visitors." Memorandum, at 9,10, citing 
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co. . 232 P.2d 210 (Utah 1951). The* 
inspections of the bleachers conducted by the University were 
undertaken in clear recognition of the duty articulated in 
Erickson. Since the weakened condition of the plank that failed 
beneath Ms. Ilott was not apparent, she could only establish the 
ILOTT V. U OF U PAGE 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
University's negligence by proving that a reasonable inspection 
would have revealed its true condition. Accordingly, the crux of 
the plaintiff's case is in fact premised on the defendant's 
negligent or inadequate inspection. 
Having determined that the plaintiff's claims are based on the 
theory of negligent inspection, I turn to the question of whether 
the defendant's inspection of the bleachers falls within the ambit 
of immunity granted under paragraph (4). The Utah Supreme Court 
has addressed the scope of paragraph (4) in two cases: Ericksen v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993), and Nixon v. Salt 
Lake City Corp. . 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995) . Each of these cases 
pares back the application of inspection immunity in different 
ways. 
In Ericksen, the court decided whether immunity should be 
granted when the negligent conduct complained of occurred 
incidental to the actual inspection. The court indicated that 
"[t]he question of whether a governmental entity is liable for the 
negligent inspection of property most frequently arises when the 
entity undertakes inspections to assure compliance with building, 
ILOTT V. U OF U PAGE 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
fire, electric and other safety codes." Id. at 997 (citing 57A 
Am.Jur.2d Negligence §376 (1989)). The court also noted its belief 
that "the legislature intended to preserve a narrow immunity for 
inspections to allow inspectors to perform their work without fear 
that an oversight which later causes injury would give rise to 
liability on the part of a governmental entity." Id. at 998. The 
court held that immunity related to negligent inspection "was 
intended to immunize only the conclusions and results of an 
inspection where the inspector may have overlooked something or 
made a faulty judgment in deciding whether to approve or reject the 
subject of the inspection." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, under 
Ericksen, the first component of immunity for negligent inspection 
is that inspectors who conduct themselves negligently while making 
an inspection are not immunized - the Ericksen inspector 
negligently opened the wrong overhead door while conducting^the • 
inspection of a building under construction dislodging a ladder 
which was placed against the door and injuring the* worker who 
occupied it - while inspectors that reach incorrect conclusions 
and results from an inspection enjoy immunity. 
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In Nixon, court restricted the reach of inspection immunity 
by denominating the failure to identify and repair faulty cleaning 
equipment as a shortcoming in maintenance and not inspection. The 
court determined that this was not a case "where an inspector 
failed to determine that a particular building or piece of 
equipment was unsafe for the public as whole." Id. at 269, In 
reaching this decision, the court discussed the genesis of immunity 
for negligent inspection as being the "public duty doctrine" which 
uxoperates to disallow recovery by individuals for such inspections 
on the ground that the [inspection] was intended to protect the 
general public, and to provide a means of enforcing a third-party's 
duty to repair defects, rather than to protect"va particular 
individual or class of individuals.'" Id. (citing 57A Am. Jur. 2d 
Negligence §376) (Emphasis added). Therefore, while the Ericksen 
court reiterated its view that the inspection immunity is to~be%< 
parceled out parsimoniously, it is properly invoked where the 
inspection is undertaken to safeguard the general public. 
Various rationales for the public duty doctrine exist. 
Foremost among them is the notion that the governments interest in 
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safeguarding the public interest predominates over the interests of 
any one individual. The Utah Supreme Court in Gillman v. 
Department of Financial Institutions. 782 P.2d 506, 513 ^ (Utah 
1989), discussed the reasoning behind the public duty doctrine in 
the context of immunity granted in connection with the issuance, 
denial, suspension, or revocation of licenses. The court quoted 4 
California Law Revision Commfn, Reports, Recommendations and 
Studies 817-18 (1963): 
'"Public entities and public employees should not be 
liable for failure to make arrests or otherwise to 
enforce any law. They should not be liable for failing to 
inspect persons or property adequately to determine 
compliance with health and safety regulations*. Nor should 
they be liable for negligent or wrongful, issuance or 
revocation of licenses and permits. The'government has 
undertaken these activities to insure public health and 
safety. To provide the utmost public protection, 
governmental entities should not be dissuaded from 
engaging in such activities by the fear that liability 
may be imposed if an employee performs his duties 
inadequately. Moreover, if liability existed for this 
type of activity, the risk exposure to which a public 
entity would be subject would include virtually all 
activities going on within the community. There would be 
potential governmental liability for all building 
defects, for all crimes, and for all outbreaks of 
contagious disease. No private person is subjected to 
risks of this magnitude.... Far more persons would suffer 
if government did not perform these functions at all than 
would be benefitted by permitting recovery in those cases 
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where the government is shown to have performed 
inadequately.'" 
Id. at 513. 
Pursuant to the analytical model established in Ericksen and 
Nixon, I conclude that the defendant has established both 
components of immunity for inspection. First, the plaintiff's 
injuries stem from the incorrect conclusion reached by the 
individuals who inspected the bleachers that all of the bleachers 
were safe for the public using Rice Stadium. In other words, the 
plaintiff's injuries resulted directly from an alleged oversight 
related to the actual inspection process. The second component of 
public duty is also met because the University/s inspectors 
allegedly failed to determine that at least one of the bleachers, 
which collapsed when the plaintiff stood on it, was unsafe for 
public use. It is evident that the inspection of the bleachers was 
undertaken to insure public health and safety. Since the 
plaintiff's injuries arose as a result of incorrect conclusions and 
results of an inspection which was undertaken for the public in 
general, the exception to the waiver of immunity found in §63-30-
10(4) applies to bar the plaintiff's action. 
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Counsel for the defendant is to prepare an Order consistent 
with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this / ( day of July, 1999. 
RONALD E. NEHRING 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960906196 PI 
Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
Defendant University of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was heard by the court on May 18, 1999 at 9:00 a.m. before the 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehring. Plaintiff was represented by Peter 
Collins, and Defendant was represented by J. Wesley Robinson. 
Having considered the pleadings, record, and other documents 
submitted, and hearing the arguments of counsel for the parties, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. For the reasons set forth in the court's Memorandum 
Decision dated July 19, 1999, Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted, and Plaintiff's action is dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits. 
DATED this z$ day of 1999. 
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